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ABSTRACT
Latin America has been seen over the years as a violent region. Organized 
crime has been a major factor contributing to that perception. Crime not only 
makes daily life more dangerous for citizens of a country, but can even challenge 
the viability of governments. Crime fighting efforts drain state resources, threa-
ten the delivery of public services, and might have a negative influence on ins-
titutional stability and business environment. The purpose of this paper is to 
extend the empirical framework of Bengoa and Sánchez-Robles (2002) to cover 
the relationship between organized crime, foreign direct investment (fDi) and 
growth. Although the relationship between organized crime and fDi is not widely 
discussed in the literature, it can be argued that there is a very important channel 
through which this relationship may exist: institutional instability of states and 
viability of governments. The paper finds that there is no significant correlation 
between organized crime and fDi flows. The results also show that there is a 
negative relationship between fDi and growth. The relationship between fDi and 
growth was explored cautiously because the economic literature suggests that 
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there is a two-way causal link between these two variables. That possible source of 
endogeneity in the analysis is addressed econometrically in this paper using the 
Two Stage Least Squares (2sls) technique. The use of 2sls was not originally con-
sidered by Bengoa and Sánchez-Robles (2002), and therefore it is an additional 
contribution of this paper to the literature.
Key Words: Organized crime, foreign direct investment, economic growth, 
Latin America
jel Classifications: F21, F36, O40
RESUMEN
Crimen organizado, inversión extranjera directa y 
crecimiento económico: El caso de América Latina
Durante muchos años, América Latina ha sido considerada como una región 
con problemas de violencia. El crimen organizado ha sido un factor importante 
que ha contribuido a tal percepción. El crimen no sólo hace que el día a día de 
los ciudadanos de un país sea más peligroso, sino que también puede compro-
meter la viabilidad de los gobiernos. Los esfuerzos realizados para luchar contra 
el crimen organizado absorben una parte significativa de los recursos del Estado, 
amenazan la provisión de servicios públicos, y pueden llegar a tener un efecto ne-
gativo sobre la estabilidad institucional y el clima de negocios. Este trabajo busca 
extender la estrategia empírica de Bengoa y Sanchez-Robles (2002) para analizar 
la relación entre el crimen organizado, la inversión extranjera directa (ieD) y el cre-
cimiento económico. Aunque la relación entre el crimen organizado y la ieD no 
ha sido discutida ampliamente en la literatura, es posible argumentar que hay un 
canal muy importante por medio del cual tal relación podría existir: inestabilidad 
institucional de los estados y viabilidad de los gobiernos. Este trabajo encuentra 
que no hay una correlación significativa entre el crimen organizado y los flujos de 
ieD. Los resultados también muestran que existe una relación negativa entre la ieD 
y el crecimiento económico. La relación entre la ieD y el crecimiento fue explo-
rada con cautela porque la literatura económica sugiere que existe una relación 
causal de dos vías entre estas dos variables. Esta posible fuente de endogeneidad 
se aborda econométricamente utilizando la técnica Mínimos Cuadrados Ordi-
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narios en Dos Etapas (2sls). El uso de 2sls no fue considerada inicialmente por 
Bengoa y Sanchez-Robles (2002), y por tanto es una contribución adicional de 
este trabajo a la literatura.
Palabras clave: Crimen organizado, inversión extranjera directa, crecimiento 
económico, América Latina.
Clasificaciones jel: F21, F36, O40
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, Latin America has been seen as a violent region. Organized 
crime has been a major factor contributing to that perception. The fact that some 
countries from the area are major producers of drugs or are routes for the inter-
national drug traffic cartels has important implications for organized crime, and 
has increased the concern over the negative repercussions of this phenomenon 
on institutional stability and business environment and, thus, on regional growth 
(Soares and Naritomi, 2010). Pion-Berlin and Trikunas (2011) highlight that high 
levels of criminal violence not only make daily life more dangerous for citizens 
of a country, but can even challenge the viability of governments. In fact, crime 
fighting efforts drain state resources and threaten the delivery of other public 
services. 
Some years ago, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2002) explored the interplay 
between economic freedom, foreign direct investment (fDi) and economic growth 
using panel data analysis for a sample of 18 Latin American countries. The pur-
pose of the present paper is to extend the empirical framework of Bengoa and 
Sanchez-Robles (2002) to cover the relationship between organized crime, fDi and 
growth. Since organized crime has an important impact on institutional stability 
and business environment, it makes sense to analyze the interplay between these 
variables. 
The literature on the relationship between crime and fDi is not very abundant. 
In fact, only one paper directly examines this relationship in Latin America. 
Manrique (2006) analyzes the relationship in the region between organized crime 
and fDi. According to his research, organized crime intimidates civil society, and 
the social and economic costs of insecurity affect foreign investment, as infra-
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structure is destroyed and additional security services are needed. Daniele and 
Mariani (2010) also contribute to the analysis, but using the Italian case. They 
examine the geography of organized crime in Italy and estimate its impact on the 
distribution of fDi inflows at the provincial level using different kinds of crime 
data. The results show that the correlation between organized crime and fDi in-
flows into the Italian provinces is negative and significant. 
Although the relationship between organized crime and fDi is not widely dis-
cussed in the literature, I argue that there is a very important channel through 
which this relationship may exist: institutional instability of states and viability 
of governments. 
Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2011) find that the real risk to both individual 
and national security can be found in violent, well-organized nonstate actors. 
These actors include youth gangs, transnational criminal-trafficking organiza-
tions, and terrorists. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas see these groups are very violent, 
well armed, and well funded. As part of their illegal activities, they are ready to 
compete with each other for control over drugs and contraband. According to 
Bagley (2004), patterns of patrimonial rule, clientelism, and bureaucratic corrup-
tion in Latin America have encouraged organized crime groups to use tactics of 
bribery, blackmail and intimidation to maintain their illicit businesses. In fact, 
as Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003) argue, organized crime is more than an isolated 
criminal phenomenon; there are links between the political, socio-economic, 
criminal justice and legal domains.
Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003) find that the levels of organized crime and 
corruption in the public sector are primarily determined by the quality of core 
public state institutions, such as the police, prosecution and the courts. Accord-
ing to them, this relationship holds for countries at all levels of development. 
Additionally, they highlight that, other than these institutional determinants, 
high levels of organized crime and corruption are linked to low levels of human 
development, generating a vicious circle of poverty exploited and compounded 
by organized crime. In fact, Buscaglia and van Dijk show that organized crime 
and corruption prosper in an environment of bad governance. 
Nagle (2002) points out that organized crime was part of the fabric of Latin 
American governments for most of the twentieth century. Despite efforts to com-
bat it, transnational criminal activities are thriving in the hemisphere. In fact, 
the fragility of the rule of law in Latin America has allowed organized criminal 
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enterprises to take root. Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003) also highlight that poverty 
and unemployment do not just provide a greater supply of potential illegal labor 
for organized criminal activities, but they also create a favorable environment for 
criminals to exploit the social fabric of countries as a foundation for organized 
crime. This is indeed a significant problem in Latin America, where the levels of 
poverty and unemployment are high. 
One conclusion of the analysis that follows is that there is no significant cor-
relation between organized crime and fDi flows. The results also show that there 
is a negative relationship between fDi and growth. This finding, however, was 
explored cautiously because the economic literature suggests that there is a two-
way causal link between fDi and growth. That possible source of endogeneity in 
the analysis is addressed econometrically in this paper using the Two Stage Least 
Squares (2sls) technique. The use of 2sls was not originally considered by Bengoa 
and Sanchez-Robles (2002), so one contribution of this paper is to fill that gap. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section ii a review of the literature is 
presented; the conceptual framework is presented in section iii; in section iv the 
model specification is introduced; the data is presented in section v; econometric 
strategy and results are presented in section vi; and section vii concludes.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There are a number of studies on the determinants of fDi in the Latin Ameri-
can case. These studies have pointed out the importance of variables like market 
size, macroeconomic stability and capital liberalization as determinants of fDi. 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, only one directly examines the relationship in Latin 
America (Manrique, 2006). What follows is a brief review of the literature on 
the determinants of fDi in Latin America and its relationship to growth. This 
overview is relevant because it provides a discussion of the variables that should 
be included in the econometric model specified below. The literature examined 
is limited to the Latin American case, given the focus of the paper. For a general 
survey of the determinants of fDi and the relationship between fDi and economic 
growth the reader should refer to Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002), Borensztein, 
Lee and De Gregorio (1998), and Agarwal (1980).
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A. Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America
Montero (2008) uses panel data for fifteen countries to study the determinants 
of fDi in Latin America. He argues that foreign investors view current account 
surpluses or low deficits as credible signs of a commitment to good macroeco-
nomic management. Additionally, he finds that infringements of political and 
civil rights and the relative level of political terror are not consistent predictors 
of fDi. 
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) study the effects of different economic reforms 
for attracting fDi, using a panel-corrected standard error procedure. In contrast to 
Montero, they argue that attempts to minimize expropriation risk enhance foreign 
investor interest. Additionally, they find that good governance is an important 
factor in attracting fDi. However, according to Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006), 
most economic reforms, including international capital liberalization, tax reform 
and privatization, have a limited effect on fDi.
Fukumi and Nishijima (2010) use panel data for 19 countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean to show the relationship between fDi and institutional quality. 
They use the average of three indexes (law and order, bureaucratic efficiency and 
corruption) to create an index of institutional quality. Fukumi and Nishijima 
(2010) find that fDi could improve the quality of institutions, while better institu-
tions could attract more fDi into the region. They show that factors such as the 
improvement of macroeconomic performance, liberalization and institutional 
reform attract investors. Their results indicate that an increase in fDi inflows, 
accompanied by easing of capital controls, can play a crucial role in improving 
institutional quality. They conclude that the region is in urgent need of institu-
tional reform.
In sum, the papers mentioned above highlight the importance of including 
variables related to macroeconomic performance and institutional background 
in the specification used to analyze the determinants of fDi.
B. Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in Latin America
Using a panel data econometric approach, Zhang (2001) studies eleven econo-
mies in Latin America and East Asia to show that the extent to which fDi enhan-
ces growth depends on country-specific characteristics. He uses Granger causality 
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tests to establish the causal relationship between fDi and gDp. In fact, Zhang shows 
that there are significant differences between East Asia and Latin America when 
their patterns of fDi growth are compared. The country-specific characteristics 
that Zhang highlights are education, macroeconomic stability, liberalization of 
the trade regime, and incentives for export-oriented fDi. 
Mengistu and Adams (2007) use a cross-section dataset of 88 developing 
countries to show that fDi is positively and significantly correlated with economic 
growth. Additionally, they show that a country’s institutional infrastructure is 
positively and significantly correlated with economic growth. In this paper a poli-
tical risk measure is taken as a proxy of institutional or governance infrastructure. 
In the same line of analysis as Mengistu and Adams (2007), Hsiao and Chen 
(2003) had previously explored the importance of institutions and urbanization 
in the study of the relationship between fDi and economic growth. They use a pa-
nel of 23 developing countries covering a time period between 1976 and 1997 to 
analyze the factors that determine fDi. Their results show that economic growth, 
predictable behavior, trustworthiness and commitment of governing institutions, 
infrastructural development of cities, and lower tax rates are important factors in 
attracting fDi. Additionally, Hsiao and Chen find a feedback relation between fDi 
and economic growth.
Sylwester (2005) explores how fDi affects economic growth in 29 less develo-
ped countries using cross section data for the period 1970-1989. Using proxies 
for economic openness, political instability, and schooling as control variables, he 
finds a positive relation between fDi and economic growth and no evidence that 
fDi raises income inequality. His main argument is that finding ways to attract fDi 
can promote growth without skewing income distributions. 
Contrary to the other papers referenced in this review, Tsai (1994) does not 
find any strong effects of fDi on growth in a sample of lDcs taken from the 1970s 
and 1980s. He argues that ignoring the simultaneity between determinants and 
consequences of fDi is very likely to lead to unreliable results. Therefore, he uses 
a simultaneous equation model with economic growth and fDi per capita as de-
pendent variables.
The pioneering work of Bhagwati (1978) should also be considered. Bhagwati 
(1973) examined how a restrictive or open trade regime can set limits to the gains 
from fDi. The Bhagwati hypothesis states that gains from fDi are probably much 
lower or even negative under an import substitution regime, compared to those 
under a policy regime that promotes trade (Bhagwati, 1978, 1994). An additional 
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contribution of our article to the literature is the use of the Index of Econo-
mic Freedom as an explanatory variable, which is a more appropriate way of 
incorporating trade regimes into the analysis, instead of including a trade regime 
dummy, as is usually done. The inclusion of the Index of Economic Freedom as 
an explanatory variable will be discussed in section iv.
Finally, it is important to mention the work of De Mello (1997), who surveys 
the latest contributions in the literature on fDi and growth in developing coun-
tries. De Mello argues that the impact of fDi on growth can be manifold and 
vary a great deal between technologically advanced and developing countries. 
The impact of fDi on growth in the recipient economy depends on the scope of 
efficiency spillovers to domestic firms, by which fDi leads to increasing returns in 
domestic production. De Mello is an indispensable reference for those interested 
in a more complete perspective of the literature in this area. 
In sum, the papers reviewed above highlight the importance of including 
variables related to macroeconomic performance, trade regimes, institutional 
background, and educational levels in the specification used to determine the 
relationship between fDi and growth.
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Following Manrique (2006), it is argued here that organized crime, through 
its effects on the social and economic costs of insecurity, affects foreign inves-
tment. Organized crime is associated with high social costs because it destroys 
infrastructure and raises the need for additional security services, thus affecting 
the flow of fDi. Therefore, there is a one-way relationship between organized cri-
me and fDi. Organized crime may have a direct influence on economic growth as 
well. In what follows, this possible direct relationship is not explored because it 
goes beyond the scope of this paper; it remains a topic for future research.
Economic theory has pointed to a causal relationship between economic 
growth and fDi that can run in either direction (Tsai 1994). In one direction, fDi 
can be attracted by host country economic growth if the host country offers a size-
able consumer market. fDi serves as a substitute for commodity trade and leads 
to greater economies of scale and cost efficiency in the host country. In the other 
direction, fDi can contribute to host country economic growth through increases 
in its capital stock, via the introduction of complementary inputs, technology 
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transfer and skill acquisition, or increasing competition in local industry (Dhakal 
et. al, 2007). 
IV. MODEL SPECIFICATION
In this empirical exercise, two different models are used to analyze the inter-
play between organized crime, fDi and economic growth. One model estimates 
the determinants of fDi and the other determines the relationship between fDi 
and economic growth. In what follows the economic rationale of these two mod-
els will be discussed.
A. Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

























fDi is the ratio of fDi inflows to real gDp (constant 2000 us$); 
lgDp is the lagged log of real gDp (constant 2000 us$); 
rex is the real exchange rate; 
Ds is the ratio of debt service payments to exports of goods and services; 
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airt is air transport freight costs relative to country size; 
geD is government expenditures on education as a percentage of gni (constant 
2000 us$); 
cr is credit channeled by the banking system to the private sector as a percent-
age of gDp; 
ef is the economic freedom index calculated by the Fraser Institute; 
oc is a proxy for organized crime; and 
co is a proxy for corruption.
B. Economic Rationale for the Foreign Direct Investment Model
This section presents the economic rationale for the variables included in the 
model. The focus of this paper is on the empirical relationship between orga-
nized crime and fDi. Therefore, the variable that takes up most of our attention 
is organized crime. 
It is not easy, however, to quantify organized crime. Data are often lacking and 
the number of observations tends to under-report the effective dimension of the 
problem. Notwithstanding these limitations, the variable organized crime (oc) is 
quantified using survey data from the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opin-
ion Survey about the costs to businesses of organized crime. Examples of these 
costs include mafia-oriented racketeering and extortion. Business executives are 
asked in surveys the question of whether organized crime imposes significant costs 
on businesses, using a scale from 1 to 7, where a score of 1 indicates significant 
(higher) costs to businesses. This variable is a good proxy for organized crime in 
this case. 
Organized crime has an important negative impact on institutional stability 
and business environment. Therefore, it follows that when companies perceive 
high costs associated with organized crime, the levels of fDi should be lower. For 
these reasons, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. However, 
though it is a good proxy for organized crime, the perception of firms has some 
limitations. Opinion surveys capture perceptions of business executives and are 
not necessarily representative of the broader population. Also the results of sur-
veys may be influenced by prevailing trends in economic conditions and by recent 
events (Inter American Development Bank, 2011). It is impossible to control for 
these limitations, but they should be considered for possible policy implications.
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The lagged log of real gDp (lgDp) is used as a proxy for Latin America’s poten-
tial market size because foreign investors make their investment decisions based 
on expectations generated, in part, by the level of real gDp in the preceding year. 
This variable was lagged to avoid the simultaneity problem that may arise when 
using it as a regressor (Ramirez, 2010). Its coefficient is expected to be positive.
The real exchange rate is included in the model because it relates economic 
policy and international competitiveness. According to Ramirez (2010), a real 
appreciation of the domestic currency should increase the profitability of these 
sectors and, ceteris paribus, induce fDi flows to them. A real depreciation of the 
domestic currency reduces the (dollar) value of the profits and dividends sent 
back to the host company, thereby reducing the real rate of the investment. The 
variable is lagged because the decision to invest in a foreign country takes time 
due to implementation and institutional and legal delays (Ramirez 2010). The 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. 
The debt service payments to exports ratio (Ds) is included as a measure coun-
try risk. The higher the ratio, the greater the probability that a balance of pay-
ments crisis will emerge which would hinder fDi flows to the country (Ramirez 
2010). The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative.
Air transport freight costs in relation to country size (airt) are included in the 
model. The hypothesis is that countries with better infrastructure are more attrac-
tive to foreign investors because they tend to have lower transportation costs. The 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive.
Government expenditures on education as a percentage of gni (geD) are in-
cluded as a proxy for human capital. It would have been preferable to use the 
secondary or tertiary enrollment ratio, but these variables were not available for 
every year of this study. The rationale for using this variable is that the higher the 
level of education, the more attractive it is to foreign investors both from a cost 
standpoint (lower unit labor costs) and a demand-side perspective (greater pur-
chasing power and more informed consumers) (Ramirez 2010). The coefficient 
of this variable is expected to be positive.
The credit flows from the banking system to the private sector as a percentage 
of gDp (cr) is expected to have a positive impact on foreign direct investment flows 
(positive coefficient). The credit constraint can be problematic in terms of financ-
ing the construction of new plants, machinery, and equipment (Ramirez 2010). 
The variable corruption (co) is quantified using survey data from the World 
Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey about the costs of corruption for 
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businesses. When firms expect high costs associated with corruption, the levels 
of fDi should be lower. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. 
The Index of Economic Freedom (ef) is a composite index, designed by the 
Heritage Foundation, which ranges from 0 to 100. Values for this index, as well as 
its documentation, are included in the Governance Indicators Database of the In-
ter American Development Bank (2011). The Index of Economic Freedom (ef) is 
based on an aggregation of ten equally weighted component measures of freedom: 
business freedom, trade freedom, monetary freedom, freedom from government, 
fiscal freedom, property rights, investment freedom, financial freedom, freedom 
from corruption and labor freedom (Inter American Development Bank, 2011). 
This variable can help us assess whether the countries in the sample have condi-
tions consistent with economic liberalization that are perceived as incentives for 
business activity, and are thus attractive to investors. The coefficient of this variable 
is expected to be positive.
C. fdi and Growth
Tsai (1994) finds that not only can the inflow of fDi affect the host country’s 
economic growth, but economic growth can in turn affect the direction and volu-
me of fDi. This suggests that the simultaneity between the determinants and 
the consequences of fDi should not be dismissed. A model that fails to capture 
the interdependence of the determinants and the consequences of fDi is flawed. 
According to Tsai, ordinary least squares (ols) estimates of a single regression 
equation are very likely to be biased and inconsistent. Zhang (2001) finds that 
«countries with fast economic growth, not only generating more demand for fDi 
but also providing better opportunities for making profits, attract greater fDi […] 
On the other hand, fDi inflows may foster economic growth of host countries 
through positive direct effects.» Considering the potentially biased results that this 
bidirectional causality might generate in an ols estimation, a Two Stage Least 
Squares (2sls) methodology will be used in this paper.









 + β2popi, t + β3schi, 72 + β4invi, t + β5 fdii, t + β6 rulei, t + εit (2)
17




  is real gDp per capita growth of country i; 
In y
i, 72  
is the initial level of real gDp per capita (1972); 
pop
i, t
  is population growth;
sch
i, 72
 is the initial level of secondary school enrollment (1972); 
inv
i, t
 is the ratio of gross domestic investment to gDp; 
rule
i, t
 is the rule of law index; and 
fdi
i, t is the ratio of fDi inflows to gDp.
V. THE DATA
The country panel data drew on information from the Inter American Devel-
opment Bank’s Governance Indicators base (DataGov), the eclac Databases and 
Statistics Website, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (wDi). 
The variables included were discussed in detail in the previous section. Table 1 
shows the sources of these variables and provides a brief description of each. The 
sample includes data for nineteen Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. The panel includes yearly data from 2002 to 2008. There 
are a total of 143 observations covering those years. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables included in the econometric 
models. A key feature of this dataset is that very few observations are missing. For 
example, observations about infrastructure (airt) are lacking for some countries 
(Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay). In the 
case of the real exchange rate (rex), the only country not included is Argentina. 
The variable organized crime (oc) is key to the analysis. As mentioned before, 
this variable is quantified using survey data of the costs of organized crime to 
businesses, such as the costs associated with mafia-related racketeering and extor-
tion. Business executives were asked whether organized crime imposes significant 
costs on businesses, using a scale from 1 to 7, where a score of 1 means significant 
(higher) costs to businesses. As can be seen, Guatemala has the lowest average 
index of costs associated with organized crime (2.389), meaning that, on average, 
it is the country with the highest costs to businesses. This observation should 
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traffickers has increased in a remarkable way (International Crisis Group, 2011). 
According to the International Crisis Group, «while traffickers contribute to the 
crime wave in border regions and along drug corridors, youth gangs terrorize 
neighborhoods in Guatemala City». On the other hand, Uruguay has the highest 
average index (6.144). This means that, on average, Uruguay has the lowest percei-
ved costs for business executives associated with organized crime. The descriptive 
statistics seem to capture a trend: Central American countries have been the 
main targets of organized crime over recent years, whereas countries in the south-
ern part of the continent have been less prone to such phenomena.
Another relevant variable because of its particular behavior is Foreign Direct 
Investment (net inflows as % of gDp). More specifically, it is interesting to study 
the case of Bolivia. As shown in Table 2, the average fDi in Bolivia for the period 
2002-2008 was 2.57, and its standard deviation was 2.86. The coefficient of varia-
tion is particularly high. Barja (2007) observes that, between 2000 and 2004, 
when there was an economic downturn, social unrest and wide questioning of 
the current economic model, fDi became somewhat volatile, with a tendency to 
decrease. This trend has continued up to the present. 
VI. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
In this exercise panel data is used to understand the relationship between or-
ganized crime and fDi and between fDi and economic growth. Panel data provides 
both a spatial and temporal dimension to the analysis. According to Yaffee (2003), 
the combination of time series with cross-section analysis can enhance the qual-
ity and quantity of data in ways that would not be possible by only using one of 
these two dimensions.
A. Econometric Approach – Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment
In the first part of this section, fixed-effect and random-effect models are esti-
mated to study the determinants of fDi. A fixed effect model assumes differences 
in intercepts across groups or time periods. According to Yaffee (2003), in this 
model the slope is constant but intercepts differ according to the cross-section, in 
this case, the country. Although there are no significant temporal effects, there 
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are significant differences among countries in this type of model. While the in-
tercept in this case differs from country to country, it may or may not differ over 
time. According to Torres (2007), a fixed-effect model assumes that something 
within the individual may impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables. 
Thus, it becomes necessary to control for this. The model removes the effect of 
time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables so that it is possible to 
assess the net effect of the predictor. 
The equation for the fixed-effect model is:
fdi
it
 = αI + β1(lgdp)it–1 + β2rexit + β3dsit + β4railit + β5gedit + β6crit + β7efit +  
β8ocit + β9coit + εit (3)
Where, 
αI is the unknown intercept for each country, and 
εit is the error term.
On the other hand, a random-effect model explores differences in error vari-
ances. The rationale behind a random-effect model is that, unlike the fixed-effect 
model, the variation across countries is assumed to be random and uncorrelated 
with the predictor or independent variables (Torres, 2007). This model should 
be used if there are reasons to believe that differences across countries have some 
influence on fDi. The random outcome is a function of a mean value plus a ran-
dom error. 
The equation for the random-effect model is:
fdi
it
 = α + β1(lgdp)it–1 + β2rexit + β3dsit + β4railit + β5gedit + β6crit + β7efit +  
β8ocit + β9coit + uit + εit  (4)
Where, 
α is the intercept, 
u
it
 is the between country error, and 
ε
it
 is the within country error term.




1. Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Results
The results of the econometric analysis are summarized in Table 3. Three dif-
ferent specifications were estimated, (1), (2) and (3). According to the Hausman 
test, the model should be estimated using fixed effects. The results with random 
effects are also shown in the table in columns (1b), (2b) and (3b). 
It is possible that there are heteroskedasticity problems that may result from 
groupwise differences. According to Yaffee (2003), the use of a White heteroske-
dasticity consistent covariance estimator with ordinary least squares estimation 
in fixed effects models can yield standard errors robust to unequal variance along 
the predicted line. Heteroskedasticity can be assessed with a White or a Breusch-
Pagan test. The use of computational tools, in this case stata, allows us to per-
form robust estimations and handle groupwise heteroskedasticity.
The organized crime variable is significant at a 90% level in regressions (2b) 
and (3b). In these two regressions the model was estimated with random effects. 
These results are not very conclusive because, as mentioned earlier, according to 
the Hausman test the model should be estimated with fixed effects. The coefficient 
obtained from this regression is positive. However, the expected sign was negati-
ve. This result seems contradictory because one would expect that, if companies 
anticipate high costs associated with organized crime, the levels of fDi would 
be lower. However, the organized crime variable is not significant in any of the 
regressions that were run using fixed effects. According to these results, the pre-
sence of organized crime is not a significant determinant of flows of fDi to Latin 
American countries.
Another finding is that the lagged log of real gDp (lgDp), the credit channeled 
by the banking system to the private sector as a percentage of gDp (cr) and the 
ratio of debt service payments to exports of goods and services (Ds) are important 
determinants of fDi flows in Latin America. lgDp has a positive and very signifi-
cant (at a 99% level) effect on fDi flows in regressions (2) and (3). This variable 
is used as a proxy for Latin America’s potential market size and, as expected, the 
observed coefficient is positive. The bigger the potential market size, the more 
likely a country is to receive flows of fDi. cr has a negative and very significant (at 
a 99% and 95% level, respectively) effect on fDi flows in regressions (2) and (3). 
This result contradicts the expected coefficient, which should have been positi-
ve. It could be argued that this result reflects the possibility that credit in Latin 
America is not being adequately used for financing production related activities, 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































payments to exports ratio variable (Ds), has a positive and significant (at a 90% 
level) effect on fDi flows in regressions (2) and (3). As mentioned previously, this 
variable is included to measure country risk; the higher the ratio, the greater 
the probability that a balance of payments crisis will emerge which would likely 
hinder fDi flows to the country. The coefficient of this variable was expected to 
be negative. However, the results show a different story. It could be argued that 
investors are risk-loving and are willing to invest under risky conditions if there 
are expectations of really high returns. This possibility could be explored in more 
detail in future research.
The estimations made by Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2002) show that the 
index of economic freedom has a positive and very significant effect on capital 
flows. However, the results presented in Table 2 contradict their findings. Eco-
nomic freedom is only significant at 90% in specification (2b). Furthermore, ac-
cording to the Hausman test this specification (random effects) is not adequate. 
The results of these two exercises may differ because of two factors that are worth 
mentioning. First, the time period considered by Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles 
(2002) is much longer (1970 to 1999) than the time period considered in this 
paper (2002 to 2010), and the years studied don’t overlap. For these reasons, our 
results may be capturing different time-specific effects. Also, we consider here 
more control variables than Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2002). 
B. Econometric Approach – Relationship between Foreign Direct 
Investment and Economic Growth
An important source of endogeneity is reverse causality.1 As mentioned 
previously, in this empirical exercise reverse causality poses a problem because it 
is possible that not only fDi has an impact on growth, but at the same time growth 
has an impact on fDi. The use of conventional methods to estimate this model 
can lead to biased results. To address this problem and identify the effect of fDi 
on growth, a Two Stage Least Squares (2sls) regression was used. 
1 Endogeneity occurs because an independent variable included in the model is potentially a choice variable, 
correlated with unobservables (error term).
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The goal of 2sls in this case is to find a proxy for fDi that will not be correlated 
with the error term. We call this proxy FDI . The purpose of the first stage of the 
two stage strategy is to generate the proxy; the purpose of the second stage is to 
substitute the proxy for fDi and estimate the resulting equation with a pooled 
regression. 
1. Relationship between Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: 
Results
The results of the econometric analysis are summarized in Table 4. The Sargan 
test shows that the null hypothesis (i.e., that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term) cannot be rejected, and suggests that the specification of the 
equation is adequate. However, it is important to state that the Sargan test does 
not test the validity of the model per se. Rather, the test considers whether the 
overidentifying conditions are correct. Additionally, both the Anderson and 
Cragg-Donald Wald statistics suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
underidentification, which means that the reduced-form equation is identified 
in that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor.
In the 2sls regression, the variable that quantifies the flows of fDi has a nega-
tive and significant (at a 90% level) effect on growth, casting doubt on the overall 
general benefit of fDi inflows. This result confirms theories that predict that fDi 
will hurt resource allocation, and actually slows growth in the presence of preexis-
ting trade, price, financial, and other distortions (Boyd and Smith 1992). There 
are important policy implications arising from this result. Developing countries 
in Latin America may need to reconsider the extensive use of subsidies, incentives 
and exemptions to attract fDi. But before taking any policy actions it is important 
to examine in more detail the specific case of the particular country, as the results 
of this empirical exercise are based on a cross section of countries.
Other variables included as controls are also significant. The initial level of 
secondary school enrollment (sch), population growth (pop) and the ratio of gross 
domestic investment to gDp (inv) have a positive and significant effect on growth. 
This means that higher levels of education and gross domestic investment lead to 




Organized crime has been a major factor contributing to the perception that 
Latin America is a violent region. The purpose of this paper is to extend the em-
pirical framework of Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2002) to cover the relationship 
between organized crime, foreign direct investment and economic growth. Since 
TABLE 4























Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. lM statistic):  39.452 
Chi-sq(9) P-val =  0.000
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):  6.097 
Stock-Yogo weak iD test critical values: 5% maximal iv relative bias  20.53 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):  11.015 
Chi-sq(8) P-val =  0.2008
Std. Err. under coefficients (Significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%).
29
ORGANIZED CRIME, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH…
organized crime has an important impact on institutional stability and business 
environment, it makes sense to analyze the interplay between these variables. 
This paper finds that there is not a significant correlation between organized 
crime and fDi flows when the model is estimated with fixed effects. However, the 
organized crime variable is significant at a 90% level in regressions estimated with 
random effects. This shows that results are not conclusive, because as mentioned 
earlier, according to the Hausman test the model should be estimated with fixed 
effects. The coefficient obtained with a fixed effect-regression is positive. How-
ever, the expected sign was negative. This result seems contradictory because one 
would expect that if investors perceive high costs associated with organized crime, 
the levels of fDi would be lower. However, the organized crime variable is not 
significant in any of the regressions that were run using fixed effects. According 
to these results, organized crime is not a significant determinant of flows of fDi 
to Latin American countries.
The results also show that there is a negative relationship between fDi and eco-
nomic growth. The relationship between fDi and growth was explored cautiously 
because the economic literature suggests that there is a two-way causal link be-
tween these two variables. That possible source of endogeneity in the analysis was 
addressed econometrically using the Two Stage Least Squares (2sls) technique. 
A problem encountered in this empirical exercise was the limited availability 
of information on the costs of organized crime. The information for this variable 
is only available from 2002 to 2008. It is worth exploring the relationship be-
tween fDi and organized crime again when a longer series of data becomes avail-
able. The 2sls technique may also be problematic because it is often difficult to 
find instruments that are both good at predicting the variable in question, and 
yet are not determinants of the dependent variable. Consequently, it is possible 
that the 2sls estimates are not robust to the choice of instrument. This issue was 
thoroughly explored in this paper using different tests. Results show that the 
instruments used are adequate. The issues analyzed in this empirical exercise are 
of great relevance to all countries in Latin America. Therefore researchers should 
be encouraged to consider the limitations mentioned above, and try to address 
them in the future.
Finally, one contribution of this paper is the exploration of a new methodolo-
gy to understand the relationship between crime and fDi. The literature on this 
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